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RECENT DECISIONS

GIFTS - CAUSA MORTIS -AUTOMOBILES - EFFECT OF STATUTE ON
TRANSFER OF TITLE BY GIFT AND WILL-Plaintiff :filed a bill in chancery
seeking a declaration of rights with respect to an automobile to which she claimed
title by reason of a gift causa morris. Although the evidence offered by plaintiff
on trial tended to support a valid common law gift causa mortis, defendant contended that the gift was ineffective because of the failure of the donor to comply
with a statute 1 which stated that "in the event of the sale or other transfer .•. of
the ownership of a motor vehicle for which a certain certificate of title has been
issued • • • the holder of such certificate shall endorse on the back of same an
assignment thereof with warranty of title .•. and deliver the same to the purchaser
or transferee." Held, the words "or other transfer" include gifts causa mortis, and
an assignment and delivery of the certificate of title are essential to the execution
of a valid gift. Taylor v. Burdick, 320 Mich. 25, 30 N.W. (2d) 418 (1948).
The conclusion of the court was reached by a consideration of the legislative
purpose in enacting this statute, which was found to be "to protect the public
against fraud and imposition in transactions involving the title to motor vehicles,
and to discourage larceny and unlawful disposition of such vehicles." 2 In view of
this purpose and the fact that a penalty is provided for the violation of the statute,
the court stated that "the legislature sought to cover every transaction involving
the transfer of a motor vehicle from the owner to another, as well as transfer by
operation oflaw." 8 Under such a construction ofthe statute, a problem is presented
as to how the owner of an automobile may dispose of it by will. The only express
exception to the provision requiring the owner to assign and deliver the certificate
of title relates to transfers by operation of law, which are covered by a proviso 4
rendering compliance with the portion of the statute under consideration unnecessary. Transfer by operation of law does not include testamentary disposition,5

Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4660.
Principal case at 30.
8 Id. at 31.
4 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4660.
5 2 BouVIER, LAw DrcTIONARY, Rawle's 3d rev., 2417 (1914).
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and, since the statute, under the court's interpretation in this case, seeks to cover
every transaction by which title to an automobile moves to another, the conclusion
seems inescapable that a testator must comply with the statute to effect a valid
transfer of his automobile. The paradox is that should he execute his will and
then assign and deliver the title to his legatee, ownership of the car, under Michigan
decisions,6 would pass not under his will at his death, but at the time of delivery.
As a practical matter the court probably would not hold a transfer of an automobile
by will ineffective under this statute, and yet, under a long line of Michigan
decisions, 7 culminating in the broad language of the principal case, a contrary
result would involve at least logical difficulties. Under similar statutes in other
jurisdictions 8 this problem has been avoided by holding that the statute is in the
nature of a police regulation only and does not provide the only effective method
of transferring the ownership of an automobile.9 There is also a question as to
whether the effect of this decision will be consistent with the legislative purpose
of preventing fraud and imposition. Gifts causa mortis_are normally made under
rather pressing circumstances and are not favored by the courts, since opportunities
for fraud are numerous. In requiring that the donor assign and deliver the
certificate of title to the donee, the court has indeed swung shut one door to fraud,
but in the process it has opened wide another. Assuming that a donor follows the
decision of the principal case, the donee, who possesses a revocable title to the
subject of the gift,10 will now have the certificate of title to the automobile. Even
though the donor should recover from his "last illness," an event which has
heretofore revoked the title passed by the gift,11 the donee, being the title holder, is
still the legal owner of the automobile 12 and is in a position to defraud the donor
by selling the car to a stranger. On the other hand, if gifts causa morris were
exempt from the operation of this statute, the donee, not having the certificate of
title, would not be able to pass good title by sale.18 Existing evidentiary requirements governing gifts causa mortfs are designed to prevent fraud, 14 and, in view
of the possible effects outlined, supra, it is doubtful whether the court's interpretation of the statutes in this case has contributed to their ultimate effectiveness.
Stephen A. Bryant
6

Endres v. Maria-Rickenbacker Co., 243 Mich. 5, 219 N.W. 719 (1928).
Noorthoek v. Preferred Automobile Insurance Co., 292 Mich. 561, 291 N.W.
6 (1940), and cases cited therein at 567.
8
75 Pa.Ann. Stat. {Purdon, 1939) § 37 (a); 36 Del. Laws (1929) c. 10, § 37 (b).
9
ln Braham & Co. v. Steinard-Hannon M. Co., 97 Pa. Super. 19 (1929), the
court stated that a failure to observe the regulations of the statute may subject the offending
party to the penalty imposed in the statute but does not avoid the transaction. See, also,
Cardish v. Tomazowski, 99 Pa. Super. 360 (1930); Commercial Credit Co. v. McNelly,
36 Del. 88, 171 A. 446 (1934); Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, 120 Ohio St.
568, 166 N.E. 808 (1929).
10
In re Reh's Estate, 196 Mich. 210 at 218, 162 N.W. 978 (1917).
11
State Bank of Crosswell v. Johnson, 151 Mich. 538, II5 N.W. 464 (1908).
12
Noorthoek v. Preferred Automobile Insurance Co., 292 Mich. 561, 291 N.W. 6
(1940).
18
Schomberg v. Bayly, 259 Mich. 135, 242 N.W. 866 (1932).
14
24 AM. JuR., Gifts,§§ u5-133.
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